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STATE OF UTAH, 1 
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t Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of retail theft, a 
third degree felony, after a plea of guilty in the Third Judicial 
District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether defendant attacks his plea on different 
grounds than raised below, or in the alternative, whether the 
record as a whole establishes that the defendant entered his 
guilty plea with full understanding of his rights? It is not an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea if the record as a whole establishes that 
the plea was voluntary. Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1149 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990). State v. 
Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987). 
2. Whether defendant failed to raise the issue below, 
or in the alternative, whether the prosecutor complied with the 
plea agreement? It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to deny a motion to withdraw a plea if the record supports 
the judge's findings that the State fulfilled its plea bargain 
promise. See State v. Copelandf 765 P.2d 1266, 1273-75 (Utah 
1988). 
3. Whether the trial court properly reinstated 
defendant's guilty plea and required defendant to show "good 
cause" to withdraw his plea as required by Utah Code Ann. §77-
13-6 (1990)? A trial court's finding of fact regarding "good 
cause" to withdraw a guilty plea will not be set aside unless it 
is clearly erroneous. Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 
1989). 
4. Whether Judge Moffat properly found that defendant 
did not establish "good cause" to withdraw his guilty plea? A 
trial court's finding of fact regarding "good cause" to withdraw 
a guilty plea will not be set aside unless it is clearly 
erroneous. Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989). 
5. Whether Judge Moffat sentenced defendant based on 
misinformation? It is an abuse of discretion to sentence a 
defendant based on missinformation of a constitutional magnitude. 
See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 445 (1972), State v. 
Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The relevant provisions relied upon by the State are 
set forth in the argument section of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with retail theft, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-602(1) (Supp. 1989) 
(R. 6). Defendant pled guilty as charged on August 8, 1989, in 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, presiding (R. 27-33, T. 
3-5). Judge Moffat sentenced defendant to serve a term of zero 
to five (0-5) years in the Utah State Prison to run concurrently 
with an unrelated sentence (R. 36, T. 10-11). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 1, 1989, defendant walked into a Sears 
Department Store, picked up a VCR, and carried it outside the 
store without paying for it (R. 6-7, 27-33). Defendant was 
stopped in the parking lot with the VCR in his possession and 
2 
arrested (R. 6-7). 
Defendant's trial was set for August 8, 1989 (R. 25). 
On that day, defendant agreed to enter a plea of guilty in return 
for the State not opposing a motion that defendant be sentenced 
one degree lower than provided by statute (R. 27, T. 2). At the 
change of plea hearing, Judge Moffat questioned defendant 
regarding the plea (T. 3-5). He asked defendant if his name was 
correct; whether defendant had gone over his statement with his 
The official court record has been designated HR." (e.g. R. 1). 
The transcript from the hearings on August 8 and 9, 1989 have 
been designated WT.W (e.g. T. 1). 
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Defendant states that no record of facts exists and relies on 
the criminal information for his Statement of Facts. However, a 
full preliminary hearing was held on April 13, 1989 (R. 3). The 
transcript from the preliminary hearing has not been made part of 
the record on appeal. 
attorney; whether defendant was under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol; whether defendant was threatened or promised anything 
other than the plea bargain itself; and whether defendant was 
acting freely and of his own volition (T. 3). Defendant 
responded appropriately. Id. 
Judge Moffat then told defendant he was entitled "to 
certain constitutional protections" including the right to trial 
by jury; the right to confront witnesses; and the right to force 
the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt (T. 3-4). 
The judge also advised defendant that by pleading guilty he was 
waiving those constitutional rights and that he was also waiving 
"other valuable constitutional rights" (T. 4). Defendant 
acknowledged that he understood his waiver and was willing to do 
so. Id. 
Judge Moffat then asked defendant if he had any 
questions he wanted to ask either the court or his attorney. Id. 
Defendant said "No." ^ d. The judge then asked defendant if he 
knew the possible penalties for a third degree felony and whether 
defendant's attorney had told him of the penalties. Defendant 
answered "Yes." Judge Moffat emphasized that he was not bound by 
the sentencing recommendations made by either the state or the 
defense and that he could impose either concurrent or consecutive 
sentences (T. 4-5). 
Only then did Judge Moffat ask defendant if he wanted 
to change his previous plea of not guilty (T. 5). Defendant 
entered a plea of guilty and Judge Moffat declared that 
defendant's plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly after 
being informed of his rights. Id. 
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Defendant waived the two-day minimum time for 
sentencing and requested that he be sentenced immediately (T. 5-
6). Defendant's attorney, Andrew Valdez, asked for leniency in 
sentencing (T. 5-10). The Deputy County Attorney, Walter Ellett, 
accurately described defendant's criminal record (T. 7-8). Mr. 
Ellett did not oppose defendant's motion to reduce the offense 
one degree or defendant's request to allow the sentence to run 
concurrently with defendant's other sentence. I^ i. Judge Moffat 
rejected defendant's motion to reduce the sentence one degree, 
and sentenced defendant to serve zero to five years concurrently 
with his other sentence (R. 36, T. 10-11). 
Immediately after sentence was imposed, defendant moved 
to withdraw his guilty plea and requested that he proceed to 
trial (T. 11). Defendant's attorney stated that unless his 
client received some sort of concession for pleading guilty as 
charged, it was a disservice to his client to not go to trial. 
Judge Moffat granted defendant's motion and set trial for the 
next day. Id. 
The next morning, Judge Moffat reversed his decision 
from the previous day and reimposed the guilty plea explaining 
that no -good cause" was shown for withdrawing the guilty plea 
(T. 12). The judge then invited defendant to establish good 
cause to withdraw the guilty plea. I^ i. Mr. Valdez pointed to the 
State'8 willingness not to oppose sentencing defendant to a class 
"A" misdemeanor. IdL. He mentioned the amount of time defendant 
had been incarcerated since his arrest and the circumstances 
surrounding defendant's release and subsequent arrest (T. 13-15). 
Mr. Valdez also spoke of defendant's need for a halfway house (T. 
14-17). Mr. Ellett briefly explained that defendant was released 
from prison in 1980, was sent back to prison in 1986, and 
released on intensive supervision parole in February of 1989 (T. 
17). Mr. Valdez then made a final argument that he had 
ineffectively represented defendant by indicating to defendant 
that there was a good chance that his sentence would be reduced 
to a class WA" misdemeanor (T. 18). 
Judge Moffat stated that he had clearly articulated to 
defendant that the court was not bound by the recommendations of 
either the State or the defense (T. 18). He pointed out that 
while the State did not oppose the motion to reduce the sentence, 
the State did not join in that motion (T. 18-19). He then found 
that defendant's disappointment with his sentence was not "good 
cause" to allow defendant to renege on his guilty plea (T. 19). 
Defendant's sentence as previously imposed was allowed to stand 
(T. 19-20). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant should not be permitted to raise different 
grounds on appeal for invalidating his guilty plea than he raised 
in the court below. In any event, defendant's plea was knowingly 
and voluntarily entered where the court ensured that defendant 
knew of the various rights he waived by pleading guilty to the 
offense charged. The court made a detailed inquiry into whether 
defendant's plea was voluntary, giving both defendant and defense 
counsel an opportunity to either ask questions or place 
objections in the record. The judge made sure that the record as 
a whole# including the plea affidavit, comported with Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The record as whole 
indicates that defendant knew what rights he was relinquishing 
and that defendant voluntarily relinquished them, including the 
rights to protect himself against self-incrimination, to know the 
nature and elements of the offense, and to know minimum and 
maximum sentences. Defendant's reliance on a strict compliance 
test is misplaced where the Utah Supreme Court has continued to 
apply a record as a whole test. 
Because defendant did not object below, he should not 
be allowed to argue now that the prosecutor violated the terms of 
the plea agreement. Had defendant objected below, the judge 
could have fashioned a remedy. Instead, defendant made a 
tactical decision to go forward and only objects now because the 
judge denied a subsequent motion to reduce sentence. Even if 
defendant is allowed to raise this issue for the first time on 
appeal, the prosecutor complied with the plea agreement. The two 
comments now brought into question by defendant were made in 
response to questions by the judge. Both comments were 
statements of fact already in the record, neither rose to the 
level of argument or advocacy. 
Defendant also objects because the judge initially 
allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea, but after further 
reflection, reversed his previous ruling and let the guilty plea 
stand. The judge ruled that in order for him to allow withdrawal 
of a guilty plea, he had to find "good cause." The judge then 
invited defendant to show good cause. When defendant failed to 
do so to the judge's satisfaction, the judge denied the motion to 
withdraw the plea. Defendant makes his argument without support 
of legal authority on the theory that because the prosecutor did 
not object, the judge acted improperly. Since motions to 
withdraw guilty pleas are within the sound discretion of the 
judge, defendant has not shown the judge abused his discretion, 
nor has defendant shown that the judge violated the norms of 
judicial neutrality or participated in the plea process. 
Next, defendant objects because the judge refused to 
allow him to withdraw his guilty plea after defense counsel 
attempted to show "good cause." Defendant claims that his 
dissatisfaction with the sentence created "good cause" for the 
judge to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. Post-sentencing 
buyer's remorse does not demonstrate good cause. 
Finally, defendant claims the judge relied on 
misinformation in imposing sentence. Defendant infers that the 
judge sentenced him on the mistaken belief that defendant's crime 
was drug related. However, when read in context, the judge's 
remarks do not establish that he believed defendant's current 
crime was drug related. Instead, the judge was simply commenting 
on defendant's criminal history and the seriousness of theft 
crimes in general. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT CANNOT ATTACK HIS GUILTY PLEA ON 
DIFFERENT GROUNDS THAN RAISED BELOW, OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS 
VOLUNTARY. 
Defendant claims that his guilty plea was not 
voluntarily entered because the trial court did not explicitly 
articulate the various rights defendant waived by pleading 
guilty. Defendant's claim is without merit and should be 
rejected. 
Initially, defendant's claim should be rejected for his 
failure to raise his claim in the trial court below. This Court 
should not entertain an attack on a guilty plea first raised on 
appeal in the absence of exceptional circumstances or plain 
error. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987). While 
defendant did request leave of the trial court to withdraw his 
plea, defendant did not claim that his plea was involuntary or 
that he did not understand his constitutional rights. Instead, 
defendant claimed that his plea should be withdrawn because he 
was disappointed with the sentence. Defendant had ample 
opportunity to raise his claims below and should not be permitted 
to create new issues on appeal. 
Notably, defendant's appellate counsel, Andrew Valdez, 
also represented defendant at the guilty plea hearing. Counsel 
did not raise any concerns about the validity of the plea in the 
trial court. In fact, counsel signed a statement that he 
believed defendant fully understood the meaning of the plea 
agreement. The statement reads as follows: 
I certify that I am the attorney for Frank 
PharriB, the defendant above, and that I know 
he has read the statement or that I have read 
it to him and I have discussed it with him 
and believe that he fully understands the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent. To the best of my 
knowledge and belief after an appropriate 
investigation, the elements of the crime(s) 
and the factual synopsis of the defendant's 
criminal conduct are correctly stated and 
these, along with the other representations 
and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
(Signed) Andrew Valdez/ Attorney for 
Defendant 
(R. 32) (See Exhibit "A"; Statement of Defendant). 
It seems obvious that defendant now wants to renege on 
the plea agreement because Judge Moffat refused to sentence 
defendant to a class "A" misdemeanor. On appeal, defendant's 
counsel contradicts his previous certification that the guilty 
plea was knowingly entered and now argues that defendant did not 
fully understand the plea. This sudden shift in position is 
nothing more than "buyer's remorse" on the part of defendant in 
an attempt to escape the result of his plea. See Summers v. 
Cook, 759 P.2d 341, 342 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Tactics like these 
were denounced by the Utah Supreme Court when it said, "[i]f we 
were to hold that any violation of Rule 11 automatically voids 
the resultant plea, even when the plea is knowingly and 
voluntarily entered, we would encourage defendants, convicted and 
sentenced after such a plea, to attack their convictions for 
purely tactical reasons. . . ." State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 
1301 (Utah 1986). Such tactics should not be countenanced by 
this Court. 
_i n_ 
In any event, Judge Moffat did not abuse his discretion 
in denying defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea. Rule 
11(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the 
procedures to be followed in entering a guilty pleat 
(5) The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest, and may not accept the 
plea until the court has found: 
(a) if the defendant i6 not represented by 
counsel, he has knowingly waived his right to 
counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination/ to a 
jury trial/ and to confront and cross-examine 
in open court the witnesses against him, and 
that by entering the plea he waives all of 
those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the offense to which he is 
entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him 
for each offense to which a plea is entered/ 
including the possibility of the imposition 
of consecutive sentences; 
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of 
prior plea discussion and plea agreement/ and 
if so, what agreement has been reached; and 
(g) the defendant has been advised of the 
time limits for filing any motion to withdraw 
a plea of guilty or no contest. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5).3 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing 
to comply with the strict standards of Rule 11 as follows: (1) 
the court did not inform defendant of hi6 right against self-
In 1989/ the subsections in Utah R. Crim. P. 11 and Utah Code 
Ann. S 77-35-11 were redesignated so that former Rule 11(e) and 
S 77-35-ll(e) are now Rule 11(5) and S 77-35-11(5). See 1989 
Utah Laws, Ch. 62/ S 2. Section 77-35-11 is repealed effective 
July 1/ 1990. See Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-11 (Supp. 1989). 
incrimination; (2) the court did not ensure that defendant 
understood the nature and elements of the offense and that a 
guilty plea was an admission of those elements; and (3) the court 
did not ensure that defendant knew the minimum and maximum 
sentence possible. (Br. of App. at 8). 
Defendant maintains that 6trict# and not just 
substantial, compliance with Rule 11 is required and failure to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 11 necessitates setting 
aside the guilty plea. Defendant relies on State v. Gibbons, 740 
P.2d 1308, 1313 (Utah 1987), where the Utah Supreme Court stated 
that "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are 
complied with when a guilty plea is entered." Ld. at 1312. 
Defendant also relies on this Court's opinions in State 
v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) and State v. 
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Although these 
cases stand for the proposition that strict and not just 
substantial compliance with Rule 11 is required in all post-
Gibbons cases, they are inconsistent with recent Utah Supreme 
Court rulings and should not be followed. 
Recently, in Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 
1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751 (1990), the Utah Supreme 
Court found that although the trial judge did not strictly comply 
with Rule 11 when Jolivet entered his plea, 
*[T)he absence of a finding under [section 
77-35-11} is not critical so long as the 
record as a whole affirmatively establishes 
that the defendant entered his plea with full 
knowledge and understanding of its 
consequences and of the rights he was 
-i ?-
waiving." State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403,405 
(Utah 1986); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 
311 (Utah 1985); Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 
309, 310 (Utah 1985). 
784 P.2d at 1149-50. 
Decided prior to Jolivet, State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 
1266 (Utah 1988), also applies the record as a whole test. The 
Copeland court said: 
The United States Supreme Court has said, 
"[TJhere is no adequate substitute for 
demonstrating in the record at the time the 
plea is entered the defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the charge against him." 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. [459,] 
470 . . . . (emphasis in the original). We 
think the most effective way to do this is to 
have a defendant state in his own words his 
understanding of the offense and the actions 
which make him guilty of the offense. By 
this statement, the trial court can assure 
itself that the defendant is truly submitting 
a voluntary and knowing plea. Moreover, the 
record on appeal will clearly reflect the 
defendant's understanding. Although this 
method is therefore preferable to others, it 
is not absolutely required. The test is 
voluntariness. 
765 P.2d at 1273 (emphasis added). 
Scrutinizing Gibbons reveals that the Court was 
recommending the best method of determining the voluntariness of 
a plea, not imposing a "strict compliance" test. Copeland 
clearly states that strict Rule 11 compliance is not absolutely 
required when a guilty plea is otherwise voluntary. Thus, 
substantial compliance is sufficient where the record establishes 
that the defendant pled voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently. See also State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1301-02 
(Utah 1986) (technical Rule 11 violations do not automatically 
invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea). 
In State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), this Court applied the record as a whole test to a 
post-Gibbons guilty plea citing to, inter alia, Copeland, Jolivet 
and Kay. Thurston did not acknowledge either Vasilacopulos or 
Valencia, nor cite to Gibbons. Apparently, at least one panel of 
this Court has abandoned the strict compliance rule articulated 
in Vasilacopulos and Valencia. As stated above, the test is 
whether the record as a whole establishes that the plea was 
entered "with full knowledge and understanding of its 
consequences, and the rights [defendant] is waiving." Thurston, 
781 P.2d at 1301. 
It may be argued that Copeland and Jolivet represent 
cases where the Supreme Court was applying the record as a whole 
test only because the pleas were entered before Gibbons was 
decided. This argument gains some support from the Court's 
recent refusal to apply Gibbons to a pre-Gibbons plea on the 
theory that the Gibbons decision was a clear break with the past 
and consequently not retroactive. See State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 
670, 672, n.l (Utah 1989) . 
Hickman, although troublesome, is not controlling when 
closely analyzed. First, it is a per curiam decision. Second, 
it ignores that the Court applied the record as a whole test in 
Jolivet after stating the Gibbons requirements but without 
distinguishing the case on the basis that it was a pre-Gibbons 
plea. The Court did not even cite Gibbons in Copeland, thus, 
indicating no concern that Gibbons was inconsistent with its 
holding. Notably, the Court does not even state the date of 
Jolivet's plea and mentions only in passing the date of 
Copeiand'B plea without assigning any particular significance to 
the date. The Court's willingness to apply the record as a whole 
test in Jolivet and Copeland without further explanation 
indicates that the only test is voluntariness, not strict 
compliance with rigid Rule 11 recitations. Were it otherwise, it 
is likely that the Court would have overruled Miller, Kay, 
Brooks, and Warner; or at least have expressly limited their 
application to pre-Gibbons cases. The Court simply has done 
neither and this Court should reconsider its rigid application of 
a strict Rule 11 compliance standard with this line of cases in 
mind. 
Applying the record as a whole standard, the trial 
judge committed no error in accepting defendant's guilty plea. 
Before accepting the guilty plea, the trial judge and defendant 
entered into the following colloquy: 
The Court: Allright (sic). Mr. Pharris is your true 
and correct name? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you gone over the Defendant's statement with 
your attorney? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you read and understand the English language? 
A. Yes 
Q. Are you currently acting under the influence of any 
drug or alcohol? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you been promised anything other than the plea 
bargain itself or have you been threatened in any 
way which would cause you to enter this plea 
bargain? 
No. 
Are you do doing so freely and of your own 
volition? 
Yes. 
Allright (sic). Now, you're entitled to certain 
constitutional protections; you're entitled to a 
trial with a jury, if you wish it, you're entitled 
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against 
you, you're entitled to require the State to prove 
the charges against you beyond a reasonable doubt 
and you're entitled to appeal if you were found 
guilty. If you sign this plea bargain here today 
and enter a plea of guilty, you're waiving these 
constitutional rights; you're also waiving other 
valuable constitutional rights. Are you aware of 
that? 
Yes. 
You willing to do that? 
Yes. 
Allright (sic). Do you have any questions about 
this matter that you would like to ask of your 
attorney or of the Court? 
No. 
Are you aware of the possible penalties that can be 
imposed for a third degree felony? Has your 
attorney told you what the possible penalties are? 
Yes. 
Allright (sic). And are you aware that in matters 
of sentencing anything having to do with the 
sentence that may be imposed, that any 
recommendations made by either State or by your 
attorney to the Court, are not binding on the Court 
and that I can sentence in anyway (Bic) that's 
consistent with law; are you aware of that? 
I am aware of that, yes. 
Allright (sic). And are you aware, that any 
sentence that may be imposed, can be made to run 
consecutively; that is, end to end with any 
sentence that you're currently serving or currently 
serving only one charge here. 
A. I am aware. 
Q. Are you# at this time, prepared to enter a plea? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How then do charge to Count One, retail theft, a 
Third Degree Felony? 
A. Guilty. 
The Court: Allright (sic). If you wish to, you can 
sign the Defendant's Statement; and the Court finds 
that the Defendant entered a Plea of Guilty voluntarily 
and knowingly, after he had been advised of his rights, 
which he understands. 
The Court: Are both the Prosecution and Defense 
counsel satisfied with the contents of the affidavit? 
Mr. Ellett: Yes, State is, Your Honor. 
Mr. Valdez: Yes, Sir. 
(T. 3-5). Based on this discussion, defendant argues that the 
trial court reversibly erred by failing to orally discuss with 
defendant on the record three Rule 11 requirements. 
A. RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
Defendant correctly notes that the trial judge did not 
verbally tell him that a guilty plea serves as a waiver of his 
right against self-incrimination. Under the record as a whole 
standard, however, this does not mandate vacating defendant's 
guilty plea. See Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 
1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311 (Utah 1985). 
While the trial judge never verbally asked about self-
incrimination, the record does indicate that defendant knew of 
this right. Paragraph seven of the plea affidavit states, "I 
know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I 
choose not do so I can not be compelled to testify or give 
evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be drawn 
against me if I do not testify." (R. 29) (see Appendix WA"; 
Statement of Defendant). Defendant acknowledged to Judge Moffat 
that he read this statement (T. 3). Additionally, this was 
defendant's sixth appearance before a court on various criminal 
charges (R. 9-13). The record affirmatively shows that defendant 
knew of his right against self-incrimination and the affidavit 
affirmatively indicates that defendant waived it. Had either 
defendant or counsel had any concern with the waiver of this 
right as indicated in the affidavit, either one could have 
objected prior to signing it. Neither did. 
B. NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE. 
Defendant also objects to the fact that the trial court 
did not verbally apprise him of the nature and elements of the 
offense. Defendant points out that Gibbons says, "There is no 
adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time 
the plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the nature 
of the charges against him." Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313 (quoting 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 470 (1969)) (emphasis in 
original). On the other hand, Copeland states that although this 
is the preferred method, "it is not absolutely required." 
Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273. 
Once again, applying the record as a whole test, 
defendant had ample opportunity to hear and understand the nature 
and elements of the offense. The record indicates that a 
preliminary hearing was held April 13, 1989, although the 
transcript from that hearing is not part of the record (R. 3). 
At the preliminary hearing, the State demonstrated probable cause 
in order to bind defendant over for trial. A preliminary hearing 
necessarily includes a recitation of the nature and elements of 
the offense of retail theft. 
Additionally, the plea affidavit itself indicates 
defendant knew the nature and elements of the crime. Defendant 
states, "I did take possession of merchandise on display for sale 
at a mercantile establishment with the intent to permanently 
deprive the merchant thereof. Value was over $250 but less than 
$1,000. . • . I attempted to take a VCR from Sears Department 
Store" (R. 28) (see Appendix "A"; Statement of Defendant). Where 
defendant had a preliminary hearing and signed a plea affidavit 
detailing the elements of the offense, it should be concluded 
that the record shows that defendant received notice of the 
nature and elements of the crime for which he pled guilty. 
C. MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SENTENCES. 
Defendant next complains that the trial judge did not 
apprise him of the minimum and maximum sentences for the crime. 
This claim should also be rejected. 
The transcript indicates that the trial court did 
ensure that defendant knew the penalties possible. The following 
exchange took place: 
Q. Are you aware of the possible penalties that can be 
imposed for a Third Degree felony? Has your 
attorney told you what the penalties are? 
A. Yes. 
(T. 4). While the judge asked two questions and defendant gave 
only one response, his "Yes" response to either question would 
affirmatively indicate he knew of the possible penalties. 
Defendant does not claim that his counsel ineffectively informed 
4 
him of the penalties for a third degree felony. If defendant 
were answering the second question, one can assume that his 
attorney did not misinform him about possible punishments for 
that degree of offense. 
The record further indicates that defendant knew the 
penalties. Under the notations of CRIME, DEGREE, and PUNISHMENT 
(min/max), respectively, the statement of defendant notes, in 
handwritten script, "Theft, 3rd Degree, 0-5" (R. 27) (see 
Appendix "AM; Statement of Defendant). Underneath the "0-5" in 
the Punishment column are the handwritten symbols, "$0 - 5,000." 
Beneath this handwritten note is the agreement that the "State 
will not oppose sentencing as a Class A misdemeanor (sic)." Id. 
"0-5" obviously indicates a length of time. While it does not 
have the word Hyears" following it, as an inmate at the Utah 
State Prison and a person with a high school equivalency degree, 
defendant would know that "0-5" represents years, not months, 
days, hours, or seconds. 
Finally, it should be noted that this was defendant's 
second conviction for retail theft (R. 9). Defendant had also 
been convicted of another third degree felony, conspiracy to 
commit robbery (R. 10). The entirely of the plea bargain 
agreement was an attempt to reduce the amount of time to be 
The State assumes that the defense counsel informed defendant 
of the actual penalties for a third degree felony. Otherwise, 
defense counsel is admitting by his argument that he violated 
several tenets of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including 
Rules 1.1, 1.4, and 2.1. 
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served* Consequently, the record shows that defendant was aware 
of the penalty for a third degree felony. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE BELOW, OR 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE PROSECUTOR DID NOT 
VIOLATE THE PLEA BARGAIN AGREEMENT. 
Defendant claims the prosecutor's comments at the plea 
hearing were so prejudicial that the prosecutor violated the plea 
bargain. As previously noted, the Supreme Court has long held 
that it will not entertain an issue raised for the first time on 
appeal absent "exceptional circumstances or plain error." State 
v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987). See also State v. 
Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983); State v. Steggell, 660 
P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). Defendant makes no assertion that his 
claim is either exceptional or plain error. Instead, defendant 
argues that the contemporaneous objection rule would be 
ineffective in this case since there would be no opportunity for 
the trial judge to correct defects in an efficient and dignified 
manner. (Br. of App. at 14). 
Defense counsel did not object at the time of the plea 
change, even though an objection would have put the trial judge 
on notice that the prosecutor was allegedly violating the terms 
of the plea agreement. If the trial judge found that the 
prosecutor had violated the terms of the plea bargain, the trial 
judge could have vacated the guilty plea, ordered a pre-
sentencing report despite defendant's desire to be sentenced that 
day, or fashioned some other remedy. For defendant to argue that 
no objection was required to preserve alleged prosecutor 
misconduct for appeal does an injustice to the trial judge by 
precluding him from creating a remedy for the alleged problem: a 
remedy not requiring an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals and a 
possible remand for resentencing. 
In any event, no violation or error occurred. The 
United States Supreme Court has established the standard for plea 
bargain agreements. Santobello v. New York, 404 U..S. 257 (1971). 
In Santobello, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor must keep 
his promises contained in a plea agreement, l^d. at 262. 
Violation of a plea bargain invalidates it. See also State v. 
West, 768 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988) ("The nature of plea bargains 
requires the exchange of consideration, allowing the parties 
involved to reach a mutually desirable agreement. A plea bargain 
is a contractual relationship in which consideration is passed"). 
To support his claim, defendant cites State v. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1274 (Utah 1988), for the proposition 
that a plea cannot be considered voluntary unless the defendant 
has an accurate understanding of the commitment made to him in 
the plea agreement. Unfortunately for defendant, the facts in 
Copeland bear no resemblance to defendant's case. 
In Copeland, the Supreme Court stated that M[i]t is not 
clear in this case what recommendation the State promised to 
make." Ici. The Court remanded the case back to the district 
court to determine the exact recommendation promised by the 
State, defendant's understanding of that promise, and whether the 
State fulfilled the promise. Id. at 1276. 
In the current case, defendant clearly knew the 
condition of the plea: the State would not object to defendant 
being sentenced to a class "A" misdemeanor. Defendant now 
objects because the prosecutor, Walter Ellett, made two innocuous 
statements in the record. Both statements arose because the 
trial judge asked the prosecutor if he had anything to add. In 
the first statement, he briefly restated defendant's criminal 
record, information defendant concedes already existed in the 
record (Br. of App. at 13) (R. 9-13). In the second statement, 
the prosecutor mentioned that defendant went to prison in 1980, 
again in 1986, and was recently released on parole. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court 
would abuse its discretion to impose a sentence "in total 
ignorance of the background of the defendant. . . ." State v. 
Carson, 597 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1979). The Supreme Court also 
stated that a trial court "'must be permitted to consider any and 
all information that reasonably may bear on the proper sentence 
for the particular defendant, given the crime committed.'" State 
v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah 1986) (quoting Wasman v. 
United States, 468 U.S. 559, 575 (1984)). 
In this case, defendant waived the two day minimum time 
before sentencing (T. 5, 10). Defense counsel then made his 
argument that defendant should be sentenced to a class "A" 
misdemeanor instead of a third degree felony. (T. 6-7). Defense 
counsel stated that defendant had never been convicted of a crime 
of violence (T. 7). At that point, the prosecutor, without 
embellishment or advocacy, gave the trial judge a brief synopsis 
of defendant'8 criminal record as follows: 
Mr. Ellettt Let me give you some background 
on the Defendant, BO you'll be aware of his 
history, going back to 1979, when he was 
convicted of retail theft, sentenced, and 
fined, misdemeanor at that point in time. In 
1980 and 1979 he was also convicted of 
robbery and sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison. He was paroled from the prison in 
1981-1982, excuse me and that was revoked, 
and he was then committed again to the Utah 
State Prison and paroled in 1985; that was 
revoked in September of '85 and then paroled 
again in December of #85. Then in 1986, 
convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute and was 
sentenced at that time to one to fifteen at 
the Utah State Prison. 
I assume, when he was placed out on that 
is when this occurred and now been revoked 
and back in prison to serve that term. So he 
has a history from 1979 through here with one 
robbery involved in it. And so he is not new 
to the system. And so whatever the Court 
wishes to do or consider, I think that should 
be taken into consideration. 
We would have no objection, Your Honor, 
since Mr. Matheson talked to Mr. Valdez and 
indicated he would not oppose the Court's 
running concurrently, any sentence that is 
imposed today with the sentence that he is 
now set to serve at the Utah State Prison. 
(T. 7-8) Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's 
statements, instead he recounted defendant's criminal record and 
deeds in a light favorable to defendant (T. 8-9). Mr. Ellett did 
not speak again until after defense counsel moved to rescind 
defendant's guilty plea (T. 11). 
Defendant also complains of the prosecutor's comments 
the next day. The trial judge gave defense counsel an 
opportunity to establish Mgood cause" to allow defendant to 
withdraw his guilty plea (T. 12). Defense counsel recapitulated 
his argument of the previous day and also argued that defendant's 
crime was a cry for help at a system not prepared to help him 
after his release from prison (T. 12-17). After defense counsel 
had done so, the trial judge asked Mr. Ellett if he wished to 
comment (T. 17). Mr. Ellett factually recounted information 
about defendant's parole as follows: 
Mr. Elletti Only to advise the Court, that 
my information is, that Mr. Pharris was 
released from prison in 1980 and went back to 
prison in 1986, and, as indicated was 
released approximately the end of February of 
this year and placed on intensive supervision 
in the intensive supervision parole division 
of A P and P. And aside from that, Your 
Honor, I think we have all of the information 
concerning Mr. Pharris. 
(T. 17) I_d. Once again, defense counsel did not object, even 
though he had the opportunity. 
As the record indicates, nothing the prosecutor said 
was in violation of the plea bargain. He merely clarified the 
record in a neutral manner. Defendant's real complaint is that 
Judge Moffat, who had previously indicated he was not bound by 
the plea agreement, sentenced defendant to a third degree felony 
(R. 36, T. 4, 10). It is also of note that the plea bargain, as 
articulated by the prosecutor, defense counsel, the trial judge, 
and the statement of defendant was that the State would not 
oppose defendant being sentenced to a class "A" misdemeanor (R, 
27, T. 2, 12). Significantly, as the trial judge noted, this is 
not an agreement for the State to support the defense motion for 
a reduced sentence, it is merely a promise not to oppose a 
reduced sentence (T. 17). The prosecutor never opposed defense 
counsel at any stage. Thus, no error occurred. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REINSTATED THE GUILTY PLEA. 
Defendant next argues that Judge Moffat acted 
improperly by reinstating defendant's guilty plea after allowing 
defendant to withdraw it the previous day. A review of the facts 
demonstrates that defendant's claim is spurious. 
On August 8, 1989, after Judge Moffat pronounced 
sentence, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea and stand 
trial (T. 11). Judge Moffat initially agreed. IdL The next 
morning, Judge Moffat reversed his previous ruling and reinstated 
defendant's guilty plea (T. 12). He said he was doing so because 
the statute requires "good cause" for withdrawal of guilty pleas. 
See Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1990) ("A plea of guilty . . . may 
be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and by leave of the 
court"). 
After reversing his previous ruling, Judge Moffat 
invited defense counsel to show "good cause" for withdrawal of 
the guilty plea (T. 12). Defense counsel argued that good cause 
existed because the state did not oppose sentencing defendant to 
a class "A" misdemeanor, defendant had spent time in prison since 
his arrest, defendant requested placement in a halfway house when 
he was released from prison, and defendant committed the crime 
was as a cry for help (T. 14). Defense counsel also tried to 
imply that he had promised defendant that he would be sentenced 
to a class "A" misdemeanor. (T. 18). Judge Moffat refused to 
entertain that argument, reminding defense counsel that he, the 
judge, had already stated that he was not bound by any 
recommendation from either the prosecutor or defense c&* .->1 (T. 
18-19) • Judge Moffat made a determination that defendant did not 
show good cause (T. 18-20) 
It is interesting to note that defendant cites no legal 
authority for his argument. Instead, defendant claims good cause 
existed because the State did not oppose the reduction of his 
sentence, the judge refused to reduce the sentence. Defendant's 
argument reduces the "good cause" requirement of Utah Code Ann. S 
77-13-6 to little more than an expedient way to evade a court 
ruling defendant does not like, in this case, the trial judge 
denying a motion to sentence defendant to a lower level of crime. 
Analogously, the Utah Supreme Court has held that Ma 
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, 
be liberally granted." State v. Galleqos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042 
(Utah 1987) (emphasis added). However, the Gallegos court also 
said the rationale for allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea is to 
permit the defendant to "undo a plea which was unknowingly, 
unintelligently, or involuntarily made." Id. at 1041. 
In this case, defendant wished to undo a guilty plea 
after sentencing because of the sentence imposed by the trial 
Judge. This is neither "good cause,M nor a case of a plea 
-unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily made." Because 
defendant's motion came after sentencing, the liberal Galleqos 
standard is inapplicable. Withdrawal of guilty pleas after 
sentencing is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. 
The trial court did not err in reversing its previous ruling and 
putting defendant to the burden of establishing good cause to 
withdraw the plea. 
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Defendant also claims that Judge Moffat acted 
arbitrarily by reinstating the guilty plea. He argues that the 
judge violated his duty to act in a neutral manner. Evidently, 
defendant believes that the judge impulsively set aside his 
earlier ruling which allowed defendant to withdraw his guilty 
plea. Simply because the judge reversed his prior ruling sua 
sponte does not indicate arbitrariness nor create reversible 
error. Judge Moffat clearly explained that he reversed his prior 
ruling because he had not applied the statutory "good cause" 
test. 
Defendant cites State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986) 
in support of his claim. In Kay, the Supreme Court held that a 
trial judge should not engage in plea negotiations. Ld. at 1299-
1300. Defendant correctly describes the "evil" p€»rpetuated when 
a trial judge actively participates in the plea process. 
However, Judge Moffat did not participate in the plea bargain. 
Judge Moffat listened to defense counsel argue that 
defendant should be sentenced to a class "A" misdemeanor instead 
of a third degree felony and evidently found the argument 
unpersuasive. At no point did Judge Moffat make any statement 
which could be construed as attempting to participate in the plea 
bargain process. After sentencing defendant, Judge Moffat 
quickly granted defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
Upon reflection, and obviously after his own review of the law, 
Judge Moffat correctly decided that the plain meaning of the 
statute required defendant to establish "good cause- to withdraw 
his guilty plea. Instead of acting imperiously, Judge Moffat 
then gave defense counsel an opportunity to show good caut_. 
Only when defense counsel did not meet this burden did Judge 
Moffat deny defendant's motion. Judge Moffat'6 actions were not 
arbitrary, but instead followed the statutory procedures and good 
cause standard for withdrawing a guilty plea. 
POINT IV 
JUDGE MOFFAT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
Defendant argues that Judge Moffat abused his 
discretion in finding that defendant did not establish good cause 
to withdraw hi6 plea. This argument deserves little attention. 
When asked to establish good cause, defendant's counsel 
reiterated defendant's disappointment with his sentence (T. 12-
17). Counsel argued that the circumstances of the case justified 
a lower sentence ^d. Counsel did not claim any deficiency in the 
entry of the plea. 
As stated above, defendant's dissatisfaction with his 
sentence does not establish good cause. Defendant's post-
sentencing buyer's remorse is not sufficient grounds to allow 
defendant to escape the result of his plea. See Summers v. Cook, 
759 P.2d 341, 342 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Defendant cites State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1987). However, Gallegos is easily distinguishable from 
defendant's case. As Gallegos states, "A presentence motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, be liberally granted." 
Id. at 1042 (emphasis added). Here, defendant explicitly stated 
his desire to be sentenced the same day as his plea, waiving the 
statutory waiting period (T. 2, 5-6, 10). Defendant hoped the 
trial judge would sentence him to a class NA" misdemeanor and 
wanted expedited sentencing. He only complains because Judge 
Moffat, in his sound discretion, rejected the defense motion to 
sentence defendant to a misdemeanor. Since defendant did not 
attempt to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing, Galleqos does 
not apply. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT SENTENCE DEFENDANT 
BASED ON MISINFORMATION. 
Finally, defendant alleges that Judge Moffat refused to 
sentence him to a class "A" misdemeanor because of improper 
reliance on material misinformation. He claims it is a due 
process violation to base a sentence on misinformation of a 
constitutional magnitude. See State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 
708 (Utah 1986); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S, 443, 445 
(1972)- Defendant bases his claim on two statements by the trial 
judge. In the first statement, Judge Moffat said, "Well the drug 
crimes are just horrendous.- (T. 7). In the second instance, 
Judge Moffat said: 
The Court is deeply concerned that in 
the situation we find ourselves today, the 
largest number of crimes, including crimes of 
thi6 nature, are created because of drug 
problems. While I may not feel as offended 
by somebody stealing a vcr from Sears, as 
they steal them from a home, it happens both 
ways and being done for the same, exact 
reasons. And I just can't feel that I can 
Again, defendant did not raise this issue below thus permiting 
Judge Moffat to rule on the matter. Accordingly, defendant 
should not be permitted to raise the issue for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983). 
send a message to the Board that says that I 
think that this individual ought to be 
treated lightly, simply by reason of the fact 
the vcr was less than $250 and not even sure 
that'8 a very good measurement of the basis 
upon the differentiations for sentencing. 
But that's what we're talking about, with 
what our legislature has done. But I think 
that the time has come and needs to be done. 
That we have got to get serious about people 
who cannot keep their hands off things that 
don't belong to them. 
So the motion to sentence as a Class A 
Misdemeanor is denied. The sentence of the 
Court is that the Defendant, Frank Edward 
Pharris, be incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison for the indeterminate sentence 
provided for by law of zero to five years. I 
will allow that to run concurrently with his 
present sentence. 
(T. 10-11). 
Defendant asserts that these two statements indicate 
that Judge Moffat thought defendant's crime was drug related and 
therefore sentenced him based on misinformation. A careful 
reading of the transcript shows that defendant has taken the 
first statement out of context. Just prior to the first 
statement, defense counsel was discussing, as part of his 
argument for a reduced sentence, the fact that defendant was on 
parole for a drug crime and that drug crimes are not crimes of 
violence (T. 7). A reasonable reading of the record would 
indicate that Judge Moffat commented because he considered drug 
crimes to be horrendous, notwithstanding defense counsel's 
statement. 
When he made the second comment, Judge Moffat was in 
the process of sentencing defendant. Since defense counsel had 
made defendant's prior criminal record a basis for his argument 
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for a reduced sentence, and defendant had a prior conviction for 
a drug related crime, the judge could properly address defense 
counsel's argument in his sentencing remarks to defendant. 
Neither party contended this offense was drug related. Judge 
Moffat, recognizing defendant's prior conviction, commented that 
many thefts are drug related. He did not state that he had 
information that the instant crime was drug related. 
Significantly, defendant does not cite to any 
misinformation relied upon by Judge Moffat. Instead, defendant 
merely infers misinformation based upon his interpretation of 
Judge Moffat's comments. It is readily apparent that Judge 
Moffat's statement was nothing more than a commentary on the 
criminal justice system in response to defense counsel's attempt 
to minimize the seriousness of defendant's present crime and past 
criminal history. This commentary does not establish that Judge 
Moffat's sentencing decision was tainted by the consideration of 
misinformation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that 
defendant's conviction and sentence be affirmed. 
DATED this May, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to James 
A. Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, attorneys for appellant, Salt 
Lake Legal Defender, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this 3^ day of May, 1990. 
-33-
APPENDIX 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TCJ 
T h u d Juci v,,^ ; L/Jic^-
JUDICIAL METRIC R&TO989 
STATE OF UTAH 
By i ^ . £&. 
.•-.!'/ C-,.V 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Jri£*dc /£ 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
Criminal No. 
COMES NOW, <f®t(j£ /V/Lfthe defendant in this 
case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the 
following crime(s): 
CPIME 
,. \ ^ 
^ 
PSgraq PUNISHMENT (Min/Max) 
^ _ ^ ^ 
B. 
C. 
D.. 
I have received a copy of Wie"^ tchargj}) (information) 
against me, I have read it, and I understand the nature and 
elements of the offense(s) for which I am pleading (guilty) (no 
contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as 
follows: 
1
 /AJLM /jih^r ou*4 &£# /fLc/~J&*s y4A*w *0<r&& 
My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I 
am criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the 
crime(s) charged are as follows: 
4* -JtcA* au^Z£ -^m S&* 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the court at no cost to me. 
2. "^Oiave^ j^aetr? (have) waived my right to counsel. If I 
have waived my right to counsel, I have done so knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily because of the following 
reasons: 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read 
this statement and understand the nature and elements of the 
charges, my rights in this and other proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea of guilty. 
4. If II haire not waived my right to counsel/ my attorney 
mi and I have had an opportunity to 
discuss this statement/ my rights and the consequences of my 
guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the 
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to 
have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I 
have the right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense 
to testify in court upon my behalf. 
7. I know that I have a right to testify in my own 
behalf but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to 
testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse 
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against 
me I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set 
for trial/ at which time the State of Utah will have the burden 
of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If the trial is before a jury the verdict must be 
unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the judge that I would 
have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah 
Court of Appeals ox, where allowed/ to the Supreme Court of 
Utah and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such 
appeal/ those costs would be paid by the state. 
10. I know that the maximum possible sentence may be 
imposed upon my plea of guilty/ and that sentence may be for a 
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prison term# fine, or both. I know that in addition to any 
tine, a surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 
63-63-9, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by 
the court to make restitution to any victim or victims of my 
crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive 
periods, or the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to 
more than one charge. I also know that if I am on probation, 
parole or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I 
have been convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea 
in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed upon me. ^*^^\ 
12. I know and understand that by pleadin<ft guilty^ (no 
contest) I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights 
set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know that by 
entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I 
have committed the conduct alleged and I am guilty of the 
crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) of/(guilty)y (no contest) is/is not the 
result of a plea bargain between myself and the prosecuting 
attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea 
bargain, if any, are fully contained in the Plea Agreement 
attached to this affidavit. 
14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by 
either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they 
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express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also 
not binding on the court. 
15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any 
kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no 
promises except, those contained herein and in the attached 
plea agreement, have been made to me. 
16. I have read this statement or I have had it read to 
me by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know 
that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this 
affidavit. I do not wish to make any changes because all of 
the statements are correct. 
17. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
18. I am ^ years of age; I have attended school 
through the •^rade""~and I can read and understand the 
English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication or intoxicants when the decision to enter the 
plea(s) was made. I am not presently under the influence of 
any drugs, medication or intoxicants. 
19. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning 
mind, mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect 
or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily enteripg my plea. 
DATED this (3 ' dav of F^^O-z^ 19. 
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY ' "7\ 
I certify that I am the attorney fo 
the defendant above, and that I know(jhe^he has read the 
statement or that I have read it to (him/her and I have 
discussed it with^niny/her and believe that</^ 5e/she fully 
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true, 
mey-
CERTIFICATE OF FftOSEOUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I anrttreN^ attorney for the State of Utah in 
the case against«—/"j/c^t^N ^ fy^ f O ^ , defendant. I have 
reviewed this statement of the defendant and find that the 
declarations, including the elements of the offense of the 
charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct which constitutes the offense are true and correct. No 
improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea 
have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement 
or as supplemented on record before the court. There is 
reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the 
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plea(s) is/are entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would 
serve the public interest. 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement 
and certification, the court finds the defendant's plea of 
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is so ordered that 
the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) 
set forth in the statement be^accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this 
c t   t . 
C dav Gts/jU^t^Ss? 
